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Theorem 3.2 (Completeness of Propositional Calculus)
Let

be a set of formulas of the propositional calculus, and let

be one such formula. Then
First we need to define consistency, both the syntactic variety and the
semantic variety. In the syntactic variety we say simply that a set
is consistent, which is to say that it's
not the case that from this set a contradiction can be proved (in some
particular proof theoretic scheme; we have been using the Fitch-style
system seen in HYPERPROOF). (A set
is then inconsistent provided that there is a formula
such that
and
.
This is equivalent to saying that
is
inconsistent when every formula can be derived from this set.)
The semantic variety of consistency is truth-functional
consistency. We say that a set
of formulas of the propositional calculus is truth-functionally
inconsistent exactly when there is no truth-value assignment
such that
.
Let us first recast the completeness theorem into an equivalent form
that will be easier to prove. This recasting uses two facts that are
easy to prove, namely,
- For any set
of formulas of the propositional calculus,
and any formula
of the propositional calculus,
if and only if
is
truth-functionally inconsistent.
- For any set
of formulas and any formula
,
both of
the propositional calculus,
iff
is inconsistent.
It follows from these two facts that the Completeness Theorem is
equivalent to
- If
is
truth-functionally inconsistent, then
is inconsistent,
which in turn is entailed by
- If
is
truth-functionally inconsistent, then
is inconsistent (where
both are sets of formulas in the propositional calculus).
Finally, taking the contrapositive of this conditional, we see that the
Completeness Theorem is proved if we can establish
|
(3.4) |
 |
Now, in order to prove 3.4, we will need use the
following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.3
If

is a consistent set, then there exists a
maximally
consistent superset

of

.
Lemma 3.4
All maximally consistent sets are truth-functionally consistent.
Obviously, the concept of a maximally consistent set is crucial. What
is such a set? Intuitively, a maximally consistent set is one that is
not only consistent, but also so large that any individual formula
consistent with this set is already in the set.
In order to
construct a maximally consistent set we will first need to devise a
method for mechanically enumerating all the elements of
PC. There are a number of such methods available; here is one.
First, consider the following table:
The idea here is to associate every symbol from the alphabet
of the propositional calculus with the numeral to its immediate right.
Given this association, every wff has a corresponding number. For
example, the wff
corresponds to the number
It should be obvious that every wff corresponds to a one and only one
number. It should also be obvious that we now have a way of generating
all the wffs in
PC one after another. To do so, we list
the wff corresponding to the smallest number that denotes a wff (this
would be P), then the wff corresponding to the next number (Q), and
so on. (Recall that
P1 = P, P2 = Q, P3 = R.) This gives a list
of all the formulas composing
PC.
Now that we have a method for enumerating all the formulas of the
propositional calculus, we can proceed to the method for constructing a
maximally consistent set given a consistent set as input:
First, we fix some set
consistent by hypothesis. Then we set up the following
progression.
- 1.
-
- 2.
-
is consistent; otherwise set
.
,
our maximally consistent set, is the union of all sets in
this seequence; more precisely,
-
-
N}.
We are now ready to prove Lemma
3.3: To establish that
,
we
first show by mathematical induction that every set in the sequence
is consistent. The basis clause is trivial, for
,
and
is consistent by hypothesis. Now assume that
is consistent, for all
.
Consider now the set
.
There are two possibilities; either
is
or it is
.
By definition, the former
possibliity only obtains if
is consistent, in
which case
is consistent as well. In latter case
is consistent by the inductive hypothesis. Now suppose for
contradiction that
is not consistent. Then some
finite nonempty subset
of
is inconsistent.
(Why?) Let
be the formula in
that comes last in the
enumeration of
PC.
From this it follows that every element of
is an element of
.
Now if we knew that
- (+)
- If a set
is inconsistent, then every superset of
is inconsistent.
we could conclude that
is inconsistent, which would give
us the desired contradiction (since we proved above that every member of
this sequence is inconsistent). The proof of (+) is left as an exercise.
Now for the proof that
is maximally consistent.
For contradiction, assume that
is not maximally
consistent. There there is a formula
PC such
that
Since every superset of an inconsistent set is itself inconsistent, it
follows that every subset of a consistent set is itself consistent.
So, since
it follows that
is consistent. But this set
is just
in our sequence. Hence
,
which gives us our contradiction. QED
Now for the proof of Lemma 3.4, the bulk
of which we will leave as an exercise after conveying the core ideas in
the proof. To begin, let 
be the truth-value assignment that assigns T to every atomic formula in
and F to every atomic formula of
PC not in
.
(Notice that

assigns a truth-value to every atomic formula in
PC.) The lemma is established once we show
- (++)

The proof of (++) now proceeds
by mathematical induction on the number of connectives in formulas.
The basis clause is effortless: in this case
is atomic, and
by definition. We now partition the
remaining formulas into the following familiar forms.
- 1.
- 2.
-
- 3.
-
- 4.
-
- 5.
-

We give the sub-proof for the first of these five forms; the others are
left as exercises. For this form, we rely on a fact that is left to
the reader to prove, namely:
- (
)
- For all formulas
.3.3
Suppose, for
the ``only if" direction of (++), that
,
and that
.
Then
;
and it follows by the inductive
hypothesis that
.
By (
)
it
follows that
.
For the ``if" direction,
suppose that
;
that is,
.
By (
)
it follows that
.
By the inductive hypothesis it follows that
,
which implies by the truth-table for
negation that
,
i.e., that
.
QED
Next: First-Order Languages
Up: Metatheory
Previous: Soundness
Selmer Bringsjord
1999-04-19