We end by turning to questions in the 6 bullets from the original call for submissions (we have separated questions when more than one is given under a bullet):
In order to answer these questions,
let's distinguish between thinking 
and thinking. Thinking is ``access thinking," which merely
involves the
processing of information in certain impressive ways. Thinking
is quite another thing: it is
``phenomenal thinking," i.e., thinking that crucially involves
subjective or phenomenal awareness: if one thinks about that trip to
Europe as a kid (e.g.), one remembers what it was like to be (say) in
Paris on a sunny day with your older brother - whatever: any such example
will do. The distinction between these two senses of thinking
has its roots in a recent
distinction made by Ned Block between A-consciousness and P-consciousness
[Block, 1995]. Adapting the first of these notions,
we can hazard the following
definition.
Figure 3: A Simple Game of ``McNaught"
iff it has internal states the representations
of which are
Here is how Block characterizes the notion of P-consciousness:
So how should we point to P-consciousness? Well, one way is via rough synonyms. As I said, P-consciousness is experience. P-conscious properties are experiential properties. P-conscious states are experiential states, that is, a state is P-conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality of the experiential properties of a state are ``what it is like" to have it. Moving from synonyms to examples, we have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste and have pains. P-conscious properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings and perceptions, but I would also include thoughts, wants and emotions. [[Block, 1995], p. 230]
Accordingly, we can say that an agent S thinks iff it has P-conscious states.
Now we can synoptically present our answers to the big questions [many of which are discussed in [Bringsjord, 1992]]:
machines!
.
There are no thinking machines, and if the machines in question
are computers, thinking machines won't ever arrive.)
G, and possibly the
infinite
games we pointed to above) forms a sufficient condition for
intelligence (= thinking ).
I.e., if x passes TT (excels in S G), then x is intelligent
(= thinks ).
There are no empirical tests for thinking [Bringsjord, 1995].
machines will blur. It's a milestone,
a big one. It indicates that people had better buckle their seatbelts
for an age in which, behaviorally, AIs can truly walk among us.
.
Deep Blue is not AI. Deep Debate, if successful,
might lay a better claim to AI -- but we still wouldn't have any
way to know for sure.
machines. And it may be that
such machines can do 80% of the work done presently by humans.