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Ted Cooper <coopep>
Thu, 10 Oct 1996 15:49:11 -0400
How about if the teleporter sampled all your particles, then disassembled
them and made two new copies?? Which one would be you? Both...
neither? They should theoreticaly have the same memories and thought
processes, and would probably argue into the night over who was
the real one (since both would be certain they were you).
Now I'm scared... which one would be allowed to attend Prof Porusch's
class???
:) Ted
takats2@rpi.edu (Dimensia)
Thu, 10 Oct 1996 22:56:49 -0400
>How about if the teleporter sampled all your particles, then disassembled
>them and made two new copies?? Which one would be you? Both... neither?
>They should theoreticaly have the same memories and thought processes, and
>would probably argue into the night over who was the real one (since both
>would be certain they were you).
I agree that this is definitely a scary concept. HOWEVER, I believe
that there would be no qualms (in my mind only) about the validity
of existence of each person. I believe that the two people who
were prodcued would not be the same person and would each have
rights. The reason why I say they would not be identical is because
from the moment the two became a reality, they experienced separate
physical stimuli, resulting in a divergence of identical consciousness.
Just a few thoughts...
--Sarah
PS Sorry for any repeat messages, Ted.
__________the soul would have no rainbows if the eyes had no tears__________
Sarah TC Takatani
Email: takats2@rpi.edu
Electronic Media Arts and Communications
Professional Work: http://www.lrc.rpi.edu
____________________________________________________________________________
Garden Gnome <andret@rpi.edu>
Fri, 11 Oct 1996 08:23:19 -0400
On Oct 10, 3:49pm, Ted Cooper wrote:
> Subject: Teleportation
>
> [ text/plain
> Encoded with "quoted-printable" ] :
How about if the teleporter sampled all your particles, then disassembled them and made two new copies?? Which one would be you? Both... neither? They should theoreticaly have the same memories and thought processes, and would probably argue into the night over who was the real one (since both would be certain they were you).
>
> Now I'm scared... which one would be allowed to attend Prof Porusch's class???
>
> :) Ted
>-- End of excerpt from Ted Cooper
I was trying to think of an experiment that you could carry out
to test the origins of the soul (given that this fancy teleportation
machine idea works) but I ran into a few snags. Let's say you
did make two copies of yourself. If those two copies knew that
they were copies I think you'd run into trouble right away. Even
if the copies were some sort of zombies that appeared to be intelligent
but had no souls, they might be able to convince observers otherwise
if they were aware of the conditions of the experiment.
Maybe this isn't worth worrying about but it sure is interesting.
thayer
Agent Webb <webbj>
Fri, 11 Oct 1996 09:13:13 -0400 (EDT)
Garden Gnome reported:
>
> I was trying to think of an experiment that you could carry out to test the
> origins of the soul (given that this fancy teleportation machine idea works)
> but I ran into a few snags. Let's say you did make two copies of yourself.
> If those two copies knew that they were copies I think you'd run into trouble
> right away. Even if the copies were some sort of zombies that appeared to be
> intelligent but had no souls, they might be able to convince observers
> otherwise if they were aware of the conditions of the experiment.
I don't have a soul. Does that make me a zombie?
;P
-jon webb-
Xanatos <gentrj>
Fri, 11 Oct 1996 13:37:52 -0400
> I don't have a soul. Does that make me a zombie?
yes. in fact, I can solve this, as I (and you do as well) have
code to correct this situation. unfortunately, it involves cutting
off the zombie processes head. yucky
Xanatos <gentrj@rpi.edu>
Sat, 12 Oct 1996 13:41:12 -0400 (EDT)
On Thu, 10 Oct 1996, Ted Cooper wrote:
> How about if the teleporter sampled all your particles, then disassembled
> them and made two new copies?? Which one would be you? Both...
z = fork(me)
if (z == 0)
if (isMe(getpid()))
printf("Yup, this is me.\n");
else printf("Nah, not me.\n");
else
if (isMe(getpid()))
printf("Yup, this is me.\n");
else printf("Nah, not me.\n");
So let's run it and see what happens.
Garden Gnome <andret@rpi.edu>
Sun, 13 Oct 1996 12:23:59 -0400
On Oct 11, 9:13am, Agent Webb wrote:
> Subject: Re: Teleportation
> Garden Gnome reported:
> >
> > I was trying to think of an experiment that you could carry out to test the
> > origins of the soul (given that this fancy teleportation machine idea works)
> > but I ran into a few snags. Let's say you did make two copies of yourself.
> > If those two copies knew that they were copies I think you'd run into trouble
> > right away. Even if the copies were some sort of zombies that appeared to be
> > intelligent but had no souls, they might be able to convince observers
> > otherwise if they were aware of the conditions of the experiment.
>
> I don't have a soul. Does that make me a zombie?
>
> ;P
>
> -jon webb-
>
>
>-- End of excerpt from Agent Webb
Sorry, I didn't mean to imply that there was a direct relationship
between the idea of a soul and whether or not you're a zombie
(although Jon, I think you are anyway :)
When I said zombie I meant a human (or whatever) that appears
to be conscious and intellgient but is really just faking. But
maybe that's all we're doing and we've convinced ourselves otherwise.
And, for all intents and purposes, does it really matter whether
we're faking or not since we believe that we're intelligent and
conscious so in our own little universes we must really be so.
gg
Hagbard Celine <kennaj@rpi.edu>
Wed, 16 Oct 1996 12:18:07 -0400
On Oct 10, 10:56pm, Dimensia wrote:
> Subject: Re: Teleportation
> >How about if the teleporter sampled all your particles, then disassembled
> >them and made two new copies?? Which one would be you? Both... neither?
> >They should theoreticaly have the same memories and thought processes, and
> >would probably argue into the night over who was the real one (since both
> >would be certain they were you).
>
>
> I agree that this is definitely a scary concept. HOWEVER, I believe that
> there would be no qualms (in my mind only) about the validity of existence
> of each person. I believe that the two people who were prodcued would not
> be the same person and would each have rights. The reason why I say they
> would not be identical is because from the moment the two became a reality,
> they experienced separate physical stimuli, resulting in a divergence of
> identical consciousness.
>
> Just a few thoughts...
>
> --Sarah
I agree with you to this point, but there are still issues to
be resolved. Which has custody of their children? Who owns their
house? There are no grounds to distinguish the two, but if this
was done to someone without their consent, how can you just confiscate
half of their property and hand to someone else? But what else
can you do? Hate to be on the jury for that lawsuit...
Jay
---End of forwarded mail from "Hagbard Celine" <kennaj@rpi.edu>
