Eglash, Ron. “When Math Worlds Collide: Intention and Invention in Ethnomathematics.”

Science, Technology and Human Values, 22(1), 1997, pp. 79-97.

When Math Worlds Collide:

Intention and Invention in Ethnomathematics

(abstract)

Ethnomathematics is a relatively new discipline which investigates mathematical knowledge in small-scale, indigenous cultures. This essay locates ethnomathematics as one of five distinct subfields within a general anthropology of mathematics, and describes interaction between cultural and epistemological features which have created these divisions. It reviews the political and pedagogical issues in which ethnomathematics research and practice are immersed, and examines the possibilities for both conflict and collaboration with the goals, theories and methods of social constructivism.
Introduction

Ethnomathematics is typically defined as the study of mathematical concepts in small-scale or indigenous cultures. Working in many different areas of the world, Ascher (1990), Closs (1986), Crump (1990), D'Ambrosio (1990), Gerdes (1991), Njock (1979), Washburn and Crowe (1988), Zaslavsky (1973), and many others (see Fisher 1992, Shirley 1995 for reviews), have provided mathematical analyses of a variety of indigenous patterns and abstractions, while drawing attention to the role of conscious intent in these designs. The theoretical basis of ethnomathematics raises some fundamental questions for the social and philosophical studies of mathematics. If we take away the tautological definition of mathematics as "that which is done by mathematicians," what is left to define it? Once we step outside the acknowledged, professional mathematical community of the west, how will we recognize mathematics when we run into it? At the same time, ethnomathematics must answer to its use of the anthropological category of the indigenous. Why should there be a disciplinary distinction between the study of mathematics in one culture and the next? After all, the anthropologists of the nineteenth century who insisted on calling spiritual beliefs of Europe "religion" and those of Africa "superstition" are today regarded as misguided, to say the least (Wiredu 1979).

The first three sections of this essay will examine the cross-disciplinary niche occupied by ethnomathematics, and show how it is distinguished from four other subfields of anthropological studies of mathematics through the interaction of cultural and epistemological categories. The next two sections review the political and pedagogical issues in which ethnomathematics research and practice is engaged. The final two sections suggest some possibilities for both conflict and collaboration with the goals, theories and methods of social constructivism.

Five Subfields in the Anthropology of Mathematics

The anthropology of mathematics includes a variety of subfields. The five categories presented here designate fairly specific schools of thought, and give some indication of how ethnomathematics is distinguished by its unique combination of cultural and epistemological concerns.

a. Non-western mathematics consists primarily of historical studies (e.g. Cajori 1896), with a cultural focus (which has continued in contemporary works, such as Joseph 1991) on state empires such as the ancient Chinese, Hindu and Muslim civilizations. It is epistemologically based on the idea of direct, literal translations of nonwestern mathematics to the western tradition. For example, Needham (1959; 137) shows how the Chinese Chu Shih-chieh triangle can be mapped onto Pascal’s triangle by a rotation of ninety degrees.

b. Mathematical anthropology uses mathematical modelling in ethnographic and archaeological studies to describe material and cognitive patterns, generally without attributing conscious intent to the population under study. The patterns are instead seen as the structural basis of underlying social forces, or as epiphenomena resulting unintentionally from the nature of the activity itself. Classificatory systems for kinship (e.g. Morgan 1871) were the first of these models. Later refinements of mathematical anthropology (e.g. Kay 1971) expanded this analysis to a variety of social phenomena, and increasingly complex mathematical tools.

c. sociology of mathematics. Under this rubric the methodologies most closely associated with STS, that of the social construction of science, are applied to the work and community of professional mathematicians (Restivo 1993). This is not to suggest that sociology is merely a sub-set of anthropology; the term simply derives from its common usage, and from the sociologists’ emphasis on urban settings in the west. It is important to note that such theories vary along the weak/strong axis. For some there is simply social “influence” such as differing areas of inquiry; a far cry from the “thoroughly social” portrait of strong constructivism.

d. vernacular mathematics. Borrowing from architecture, we can use this term to specifically focus on those who, while distinctly outside any mathematical professionalism (of either west or non-west), would not qualify under the old-fashioned anthropological category (now primarily used in Discovery Channel narrations) of an "ancient cultural tradition."

Examples include the "Street Mathematics" of Nunes et al. (e.g. calculation by peasant pushcart venders), the "Situated Cognition" of Lave (e.g. European women's knitting as algebra), and similar designations (Gerdes (1994) lists titles such as “folk mathematics,” “informal mathematics,” and “non-standard mathematics”).

e. ethnomathematics. Cultural locations of this research emphasize small-scale (indigenous, traditional) societies (Ascher 1990). The epistemological basis is not restricted to methods of direct translation, as in (a), but also includes the types of pattern analysis seen in the modelling approach of (b). Unlike mathematical anthropology, however, this research generally strives to include conscious intent as an important component of the analysis.

All five of these categories would then come under anthropology of mathematics, where comparisons of the different research programs can take place. The categories are more or less in keeping with those already in use (c.f. Bishop 1994), but these suggestions are not meant to be exclusive, to imply a non-existent cohesiveness to the field, or to dampen enthusiasm for subdisciplinary neologisms. It is, however, necessary to begin with such terminology if we are to analyze the ways in which cultural and epistemological features of these theories interact.

2) Cultural theory in the anthropology of mathematics

The cultural categories for these five sub-fields are by no means arbitrary; they reflect both traditional anthropological concepts and their postmodern revisions. From the traditional point of view, those societies with complex social organization (e.g. labor specialization and political hierarchy) will tend to have greater technological complexity, i.e. "higher mathematics." As a universal consequence of social organization, such knowledge domains (as opposed to those of religion, for example) would be neither of great interest to an anthropological quest for explorations of social diversity, nor would one expect much in the way of social content.

Of course neither social scientists nor historians have been content with such descriptions, and two fundamental critiques have emerged. From STS we find a challenge to the assumption that technical domains, such as mathematics, have little to offer in terms of social content (indeed, hard constructivists would find the very metaphor of “content” to be an error, since it implies a non-social “container”). The other critique can be divided into its modern and postmodern forms.

Postmodern approaches, often allied with literary analysis (now frequently grouped as “Cultural Studies”) provide the contrast of orientalism versus primitivism. Often ethnocentric discourse is only considered in terms of the primitivist stereotype of people who are "close to nature" (whether the mean-spirited talk of "savages" or the well-intentioned romanticism of "children of the forest"). But as Said (1978) pointed out, there is another stereotype category in which the subjects are not too close to nature, but rather too far from it. The "arabesque mind" of the Muslim, the Hindu who thinks only of karma, the Jew who thinks only of money, and the Buddhist who is divorced from emotion are all examples. Thus the British, who could not justify colonizing India for a primitive lack of mathematics (Adas 1989), could criticize Indian culture for not concretizing its mathematics to produce engineering: they were too abstract, just as primitives were too concrete, and only whiteness held the proper balance.

Given this formulation, it does not necessarily combat racial prejudice to extol the virtues of mathematical achievements in Chinese, Indian, and Islamic empires; for the same reason that Charles Murry's Bell Curve text can promote pro-white racism by proposing innately higher IQ in "Jews and Asians." But the emphasis on advanced mathematics in these Empire Civilizations has also been supported by non-racist/non-ethnocentric frameworks in modern anthropology. That is to say, simply positing that the societies with complex social organization (e.g. labor specialization and political hierarchy) have greater technological complexity is not inherently demeaning. As diasporic poet Amié Cesairé defiantly put it, “hurrah for those who never invented anything!” Indeed, the argument can all-too-quickly turn from equality to superiority, as those following Rousseau have argued for moral superiority from technoscience absence.

Even setting aside the question of ethnocentric prejudice, however, the unilineal model for cultural evolution has been questioned on “purely objective” grounds (that’s not to say the researchers were unmotivated, merely that motivations are not cited as evidence in this argument, as they are for the postmodernist critique). Just as biological evolution has been revised from Lovejoy’s “Great Chain of Being” to Gould’s “copiously branching bush,” so cultural evolution is now typically portrayed as a branching diversity of forms. Of course, there are tremendous differences between the theories which posit a cause for this variety (e.g. environmental adaptation versus social self-determination), but the net result has been a much better appreciation for the possibilities of cultural diversity in technical knowledge.

Thus ethnomathematics, while not inherently allied to either modern or postmodern perspectives, can be seen as a reaction to the lacuna created by the field of non-western mathematics, where the "empire" civilizations had precedent^[1]. Its primary concern is what Ascher (1990, pg 1) defined as "The people... who live in traditional or small-scale cultures, that is, they are, by and large, the indigenous people of the places that were 'discovered' by Europeans." Ascher presents the ethnomathematics critique as merely an extension of cultural diversity: just as many indigenous groups create things we think of as "art" even though they have no analogous category of "artist," they can invent mathematical ideas without the category of "mathematician." But an art critic who maintains that the !Kung beaded headband is as aesthetically pleasing as the Mona Lisa does not challenge the anthropological framework. Evidence for complex mathematical ideas in small scale societies requires seeing cultural evolution as a bush, not a ladder, since the mathematics which blossoms on later branches in some societies may be on earlier branches in others.

Finally, we should note that small-scale indigenous civilizations, while easily overlooked by attention to the non-western empire societies, can also be a site of western romantic diversions. Illusions of cultural purity and organic innocence are too easily projected onto these traditional cultures. For that reason many researchers (and cultural workers, particularly artists) have developed a postmodern emphasis on hybridity, creolization, and other impure identities (c.f. Minh-ha 1986, Anzaldúa 1987, Bhabba 1990). In addition, non-ethnic identities of marginalization -- e.g. sex/gender and class/caste systems -- can also have profound cultural relations to technological knowledge, including that of mathematics. Thus the category of vernacular math has corresponded to ethnic categories which are neither socially empowered nor traditionally indigenous, as well as to other non-elite groups.

Despite my implication of historical development (one which could probably be contested anyways), it is important to avoid singling out just one of these categories as the cutting edge of social critique (or as it is sometimes referred to, the creation of a “hierarchy of oppression”). If anti-Islamic prejudice continues to rise in the west, for example, we may see a delegitimation of non-western mathematics. On the other hand, for Tibetan Buddhists struggling against the Chinese government it may help to have some Buddhist math in the curriculum, but that won't aid the Tibetan animists (Caldararo 1995) struggling against Buddhist hegemony. Similar situations occur throughout the third world -- indigenous minorities in Latin America, African animists in Islamic nations, etc.. And yet the hybridity of ethnically mixed societies -- for example the Islamic-animist syncretism often found in Africa -- is better celebrated as a cross-cultural achievement (even in cases where it is only the ironic success of resistance through adaptation) than disregarded as impure or polluted.

Such heterogenous complexities are often cited as a critique against any attempts to categorize, as our 5 subfields have done here, and portraits of a holistic “seamless web” of multidimensional relations are often suggested as the alternative. While it is certainly an error to maintain rigid or impermeable boundaries, I would like to suggest that it is possible to over-compensate. Such holistic extremes, for example, have caused problems in attempts toward interdisciplinary studies and multiculturalism in educational curricula (c.f. Roth 1994). By tossing all societies into one undistinguished smorgasbord, historical and social context is lost to a globalizing relativism. Maintaining the kind of historically composed typology suggested above can aid us in taking responsibility for those complexities.

3) Epistemology in the anthropology of mathematics

Despite the great variety of studies, there are fairly consistent relationships between these cultural sites and the epistemological concepts applied by researchers. This is particularly clear in the distinctions between non-western mathematics, ethnomathematics, and mathematical anthropology.

While non-western mathematics relies on direct literal translation, mathematical anthropology is generally seen as revealing patterns which are not consciously detected by its subjects of study. In part this is due to a conviction that much of the underpinnings of society would be forces unnoticed by its members (not only because such forces operated at levels beyond individual awareness, but also because regulatory mechanisms would have to be covert, obscured, or otherwise protected from manipulation and conscious reflection). But it also arose from imitation of the researcher-object relation in the natural sciences: if anthropologists were simply reporting indigenous discourse, then they would not count as scientists (as was indeed the case for non-western mathematics, traditionally only a subject for historians).

An excellent illustration of this methodological distancing can be seen in Koloseike's (1974) model for mud terrace construction in low hills of Ecuador. Koloseike began with two hypotheses: either the Indians learned from the Inca stone terraces in the high mountains above (a somewhat orientalist assumption about the technological contrast between a state empire and tribal horticulturalists), or they were unintentional by-products of cultivation on hillsides. He then made a list (pp 29-30) of nine observations which were relevant to deciding between the two. Of particular interest are the following:

3. The same hillside soil is used in rammed-dirt houses and fence walls, and these stand for years.

4. But I never saw a terrace being constructed, nor did people talk about such a project.

5. Small caves are often dug into the terrace face for shelter during rainstorms. That this potentially weakens the terrace face does not seem to concern people.

Koleseike concludes that these terraces are the unintentional result of an accretion process from the combination of cultivation and erosion, and then proceeds to develop a mathematical model for the rate of terrace growth. My point is not in questioning the accuracy of the model, but rather the way that indigenous intentionality is positioned as an obstacle that must be overcome before mathematics can be applied. Even a small degree of awareness -- being aware that a cave dug into a terrace face might weaken it -- must be eliminated.

In addition, it reveals a particular cultural construction of the supposed universal attribute of "intention." As a westerner, Koleseike is used to a society in a hurry. Projects to be done must get done, and always with someone in charge. The idea of a long-term intentional project, perhaps extending over several generations, or the constitution of collective intentionality rather than individual intent, is not brought under consideration. It may well be that the mathematical model Koleseike offered was not only accurate, but also had an indigenous counter-part.

Ethnomathematics, in contrast, has emphasized the possibilities for indigenous intentionality in mathematical patterns. For example, Gerdes (1991) used the Lusona sand drawings of the Tchokwe people of Northeastern Angola to demonstrate indigenous mathematical knowledge. His analysis showed the constraints necessary to define an “Eulerian Path” (the stylus never leaves the surface and no line is re-traced), and a recursive generation system (increasingly complex forms are created by successive iterations through the same geometric algorithm) . While it would have been possible to limit description of these features to the physical construction only (and thus hypothesize -- as a mathematical anthropologist might have -- that they are the result of an unconscious social process) these were, rather, placed in the context of indigenous concepts and activities. The Eulerian constraint, for example, was critical for not only definitions of drawing skill within their society, but also externally when the lusona were deployed by the Tchokwe as a way to deflate the ego of over-confident European visitors. More importantly, the construction of figures of increasing complexity was taught within an age-grade initiation system, and thus indicated the conscious use of the iterative construction as a visualization of analogous iterations in cultural knowledge^[2]. Both served to make a stronger case for attributing intentionality to the indigenous creators.

Ascher (1990) notes the same type of Eulerian path drawings in the South Pacific, but these tend to be less recursive (i.e. requiring combinations of different geometric algorithms, which Ascher likens to algebraic systems, rather than the fractal-like iterations through the same algorithm that dominate the African versions). Ascher describes the South Pacific drawings as primarily motivated by symbolic narratives, in particular their use by the Malekula islanders as an abstract mapping of kinship relations. Again, this is in strong contrast to the tradition of mathematical anthropology, where kinship algebra was considered a triumph of western analysis (and even a source of mathematical self-critique; Kay (1971) harshly notes the anthropologists’ tendency to invent a new “pseudo-algebra” for various kinship systems rather than apply one universal standard).

Ascher’s description of the Native American game of Dish shows this contrast in a more subtle form. In the Cayuga version of the game six peach stones, blackened on one side, are tossed, and the numbers landing black side or brown side recorded as the outcome. The traditional Cayuga point scores for each outcome are (to the nearest integer value) inversely proportionate to the probability. Ascher does not posit an individual Cayuga genius who discovered probability theory, nor does she explain the pattern as merely an unintentional epiphenomenon of repeated activity. Rather, her description (pg 93) is focused on how the game is embedded in community ceremonials, spiritual beliefs, and healing rituals; specifically through the concept of “communal playing” in which winnings are attributed to the group rather than the individual player. Juxtaposing this context with detailed attention to abstract concepts of randomness and predictability in association with the game -- in particular the idea of “expected values” associated with successive tosses -- has the effect of attributing the invention of probability assignments to collective intent.

At the sceptical extreme in ethnomathematics, Donald Crowe has refrained from making any inferences about intentionality, and insists that his studies of symmetry in indigenous pattern creations (c.f. Washburn and Crowe 1988) are simply examples of applied mathematics. But since Crowe has restricted his work to only those patterns which could be attributed to conscious design (painting, carving and weaving), it creates the opposite effect of mathematical anthropology's attempt to eliminate indigenous intent. This is evidenced by Crowe's dedication to use of these patterns in mathematics education (particularly his teaching experience in Nigeria during the late 1960s, which greatly contributed to Zaslavsky's (1973) seminal text, Africa Counts).

Thus ethnomathematics is epistemologically distinguished from non-western mathematics in that it is not limited to direct translations of western forms, but rather can be open to any mathematical pattern discernable to the researcher. In fact, even that description might be too restrictive: previous to Gerdes’s study there was no western category of “recursively generated Eulerian paths;” it was only in the act of applying a western analysis to the Lusona that Gerdes (and the Tchokwe) created that hybrid. And unlike mathematical anthropology, ethnomathematics puts an emphasis on the attribution of conscious intent to these patterns.

4) Situating ethnomathematics: the political context

In addition to its epistemological conflicts, ethnomathematics is emersed in sociopolitical struggles as well. These conflicts have often been as much motivation as obstacle. Zaslavsky, whose 1973 text is often regarded as the first of its genre, attributes her project to the civil rights activities of the 1950s, which resulted in an increase in African studies materials in her school, and thus alerted her to the conspicuous absence of material on African mathematics. Gilmer, current president of the International Study Group on Ethnomathematics, cites her identity as an African American mathematician in the 1950s as fundamental to her own motivations. D'Ambrosio, a primary organizer for efforts in Latin America, was inspired by a UNESCO project he attended in Mali in 1970, and later influenced by the social critique of Paulo Freire. Gerdes (1982) and Gay and Cole (1967) were specifically motivated by local efforts to overcome the colonial legacies of pedagogy in the third world.

Yet even in the postcolonial context, there is controversy over ethnomathematics. Njock (1994) notes that some of the African mathematicians have explicitly objected to the inclusion of ethnomathematics in any aspect of their discipline, much in the same way that ethnophilosophy has been rejected by some African philosophers (for reviews of this debate see Mudimbe 1988, Appiah 1992). In Senegal, mathematician Sakir Thiam has promoted mathematics pedagogy in Wolof, making use of base 5 number words to improve early addition skills, but his efforts are not necessarily welcomed by the non-muslim ethnic groups, who have been combating Islamic hegemony for centuries, and would prefer that math texts remain in French. Father Engelbert Mveng, a founder of indigenous philosophy studies in Central Africa, as well as a valued colleague in my own ethnomathematics fieldwork in Cameroon, was recently murdered in what appears to be an attempt to oppose his cross-cultural efforts.

5) Pedagogical challenges: the politics of epistemology

If ethnomathematics is controversial in the third world, then it is not difficult to see how it engenders conflict in the first, where the political ties mentioned above interact with both its cultural and epistemological categories. In some of these discussions (c.f. Jackson 1992) any tie to “political” motivations is described as an inherent defect, a loss of scholarly status, and thus (unless one is willing to deny the kinds of historical connections mentioned in the previous section) ethnomathematics can be eliminated out of hand. Moreover, it is indeed possible to cite cases in “ethnosciences” where counter-hegemonic political motivations are at fault (c.f. discussion of the “Portland Baseline Essays” in Oritz de Montellano 1993, Martel 1994). Given the apriori hostility to ethnomathematics, and its own potential flaws, its application to education has been understandably difficult. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why such efforts are worthwhile.

The education reform efforts which consider ethnomathematics include multicultural mathematics (Nelson et al 1991), critical mathematics (Skovsmose 1985), humanist mathematics (White 1986), and situated cognition (Lave 1988) among others. These approaches generally cite cultural alienation from standard mathematics pedagogy for minority ethnic groups (as well as other identities; see Keitel et al. 1989 for a detailed listing). Another important motivation is the idea that individuals from dominant groups will tend to have better relations with subordinate groups if they are exposed to more egalitarian presentations of the other's culture. Finally, there is also the contention that extreme (e.g. racist) views of biological determination of intelligence can be combatted by presenting mathematical knowledge generated through these groups.

The problem of "cultural alienation" does find support in field research. Powell (1990), for example, notes that pervasive mainstream stereotypes of scientists and mathematicians conflict with certain aspects of African-American cultural orientation. Similar disjunctures between African-American identity and mathematics education in terms of self-perception, course selection and career guidance have been noted (c.f. Hall and Postman-Kammer 1987, Boyer 1983). One critique maintains that if there is alienation, then the solution should lie in making teaching materials more universal rather than more local. A similar suggestion has been employed in response to sexism in the word problems of math textbooks, but research reviewed in Nibbelink et al (1986) indicates that gender-neutral examples have been inadequate, and they recommend reinstating gender with more balanced presentation of both male and female figures. Similarly, attempting to get rid of all cultural reference would reduce the quality of the textbook for everyone. Concrete examples are important for learning application skills, enhancing general interest, and reaching a wider range of cognitive styles. And there are many culture-specific elements, such as the Greek names of Euclid and Pythagoras, which would be absurd to eliminate, suggesting that cultural balance is a better strategy than cultural obliteration.

In support of the theory that over-emphasis on biological determinism creates a learning deterrent, Geary (1994) reviews cross-cultural studies which indicate that while children, teachers and parents in China and Japan tend to view difficulty with mathematics as a problem of time and effort, their American counterparts attribute differences in mathematics performance to innate ability (which thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy). Thus it is possible that even if the “cultural alienation” theory is incorrect, the opposition to biological determinism provided by ethnomathematics would be of strong benefit to the students. While no formal studies have yet been carried out, Anderson (1990), Frankenstein (1990), Gerdes (1994), Moore (1994), and Zaslavsky (1991) have given anecdotal reports of positive results in using ethnomathematics to teach minority students.

Despite these optimistic outlooks, there are still many potential difficulties in applications to pedagogy. Williams (1994) suggests that any multicultural science teaching implies that minority students have less aptitude than white students, since it gives them "special treatment." Although this sounds similar to politically conservative critiques of affirmative action, the accusation of a patronizing stance has also been made from the opposite end of the political spectrum:

Where there is "multicultural" input into the science curriculum it tends to focus on so-called "Third World Science" and involves activities like making salt from banana skins.... The patronizing view of the "clever and resourceful native" which underlies such practice is not far removed from the racist views of "other peoples and cultures" which pervade attempts at multicultural education (Gill et al 1987).

This critique touches several difficulties. There is a danger of singling out minority students and increasing their "otherness," of reductive presentations of minority cultures, and, perhaps most pointedly, an ahistoricizing effect in which romantic portrayals of a mythically "pure" tradition overshadow the political actualities of third world experience.

6) Strong constructivism as an obstacle in ethnomathematics pedagogy

Given the heterogenous collection of social constructivist research, it should be possible to apply some of its theoretical and empirical findings to aid in the ethnomathematics pedagogy project. Such collaboration is tempered, however, by the fragile relation between ethnomathematics and the mathematics education community, and the mistaken identification of ethnomathematics with strong constructivism.

Mathematics occupies a unique position at the end of the soft science/hard science spectrum. The first objection typically raised in casual discussion of constructivism is "surely you don't believe that 2 + 2 can sometimes be 5?" Thus mathematics itself functions as a signifier for most opponents of strong constructivism; hence their assumption that something called "ethnomathematics" must be in favor of it. In other words, ethnomathematics suffers guilt-by-association through the assumption that it is related to the strong form of social construction of science.

This is ironic since almost all^[3] statements on the subject in ethnomathematics writing are quite the opposite: they typically hold that there is a potential universal mathematics, which each culture's individual mathematics (to use Plato's terminology) partakes of. Cultural variation is seen only as the result of asking different questions; not getting different answers. Thus ethnomathematics discourse is generally only a weak version of constructivism. It suggests that each culture's mathematics is, in some sense, a lower-dimensional projection of the (according to Gödel, never-attainable) higher-dimensional whole. Since this makes it likely that some projections are better than others, there isn't even much cultural relativism, to say nothing of a strong version of constructivism. Relativism does play a part in legitimizing the diversity of social forms in which mathematics is said to take place -- we can trace graphs in sand instead of paper -- but 4 plus 4 has to be 8, even if it’s written in base 5.

As noted by Tymoczko (1986) and others^[4], even for those mathematicians who do not subscribe to the Platonist philosophical outlook, the alternative views -- logicism, formalism, intuitionism, etc. -- are typically presented as “private” theories in which “there is one ideal mathematician at work, isolated from the rest of humanity and from the world, who creates or discovers mathematics by his own logico-intuitive processes” (Davis 1988 pp. 140). Given this outlook, and the powerful influence of this professional mathematics community on mathematics education^[5], the mistaken association of strong constructivism with ethnomathematics can be damaging for efforts in application to pedagogy.

Within these constraints, I see three possibilties for a positive theoretical relationship between ethnomathematics pedagogy and social constructivism. First, we could make use of characterizations by those constructivists who have pointed out the error in conflating ethnomathematics with strong constructivism. As Restivo (1993, pg 252) notes, "these are not, in fact, alternatives to modern mathematics, but rather culturally distinct forms of mathematics." Second, if constructivist arguements (either weak or strong) were independently made more convincing to the mathematics community, it might encourage them to be more open to ethnomathematics. And third, if constructivists were able to find alternatives to the weak/strong dichotomy (c.f. Haraway 1988), the conflict could also be mitigated.

In addition to these possibilities, there are also several areas in which ethnomathematics and constructivism share concerns, and could perhaps eventually benefit the pedagogy efforts indirectly though mutual collaboration.

7) Commonalities in the research frontiers of social constructivism and ethnomathematics

The three areas of common interest suggested here are not meant to be exhaustive; hopefully this essay will encourage others to add to the effort.

a. The metaphor of translation. I’ve distingished between non-western mathematics and ethnomathematics with the rather loose idea of “direct, literal translation,” and implied that the modelling approach was something else -- but what? Similar problems have arisen with the use of “translation” in constructivist science studies. For example, Fuller (1988) makes use of the Peircean claim to an invariant content in translation as a critique of knowledge production theory. In discussing the classic controversey of phlogiston versus oxygen, for instance, he contrasts Quine’s underdetermination thesis, which would see alternative descriptions of roughly the same “cognitive content,” with Kuhn’s view of two mutually exclusive contents. Similar questions can be asked in ethnomathematics: Was Gerdes simply translating the lusona into two pre-existing western categories, or actually creating a new one?

Least this seem a mere philosophical word game, consider the challenge from Lerman (1992), who suggests that only illustrations from non-western mathematics (e.g. Vedic multiplication) be used in the classroom, because if "geometrical patterns in traditional crafts are studied... pupils can feel that their culture is being made to appear primitive." Here our problem is not contesting claims for invariant content, but rather the reverse: how can we specify similar content (geometric knowledge) from radically different statements (e.g. basket weaving versus Euclidean constructions)?

One approach would be in noting how Lerman’s characterization of ordinary mathematics pedagogy overlooks the frequent use of geometric "craft" examples from the west, such as the putative appearance of the golden rectangle in the ancient Greek parthenon, or the Eiffel Tower as fractal geometry. Watson-Verran and Turnbull (1995) effectively outline this arguement in their comparison of Gothic cathedral construction with various examples from ethnomathematics, here turning “translation” into “mutual interrogation.”

b. Intentionality. The recent emergence of agency and intent as a subject of constructivist theory suggests that there could be a useful exchange with similar issues raised in ethnomathematics. Latour (1994), for example, proposed that since agency was often denied to non-western subjects ("premoderns") under colonial anthropology, the idea of non-human agency in STS (Haraway 1991) could be helpful in new anthropological critiques. In a direct application this seems like a step backwards. Since the problem was essentially a restricted attribution of humanity (the primitive as too natural to be fully human, the oriental as too artificial) then giving agency to the non-human does not attack the problem at the source. It does no good to say "since DNA and silicon chips have agency, you can have it too." If anything, it would seem to diffuse and disable a valuable concept at just the moment when it is needed most.

Non-human agency could, however, be used to help question the assumption that indigenous societies cannot have science because of a static epistemological homeostasis. As Latour (1993, pp 42) points out, the standard anthropological account of this obstacle to indigenous science contends:

By saturating the mixes of divine, human and natural elements with concepts, the premoderns limit the practical expansion of these mixes. It is the impossibility of changing the social order without modifying the natural order -- and vice-versa -- that has obliged the premoderns to exercise the greatest prudence.

But if the "natural order" is chaos -- if it is a self-modifying, ever-changing agency -- then perhaps the indigenous social order could be modelling itself as similarly self-changing (c.f. Eglash 1995b, Eglash et al. 1996).

Conversely, the ethnomathematics encounters with intentionality can be useful to STS formulations. In elucidating the ways in which intentionality is culturally determined, we can open up questions of agency, credit for discoveries and inventions, local community interactions with the environment and technology, and other areas. Does intentionality differ between various scientific subcultures? How might the difference between collective intention and individual intent matter for STS?^[6]

c. Universality. As noted previously in section 6, one factor in creating a distance between ethnomathematics and STS is the pragmatic difficulty in curricular acceptance: its already hard enough to get ethnomathematics into the classroom, so why be weighed down with the extra baggage of strong constructivism? But there are also social theories at work in keeping this relation fixed. This concerns both ideals of ethnic harmony as well as equal opportunity. In the African-American coming of age film Boyz-N-the-Hood, moral icon Ferous Styles (played by Larry Fishburne) warns two students after the SAT exam: "Most of those tests are culturally biased to begin with -- except the math. That's universal." A metonymic relation between universals in humanism and those of mathematics is implied: if math can transcend empiricism, then perhaps it can transcend cultural barriers as well.

This framing of local v.s. universal knowledge status cuts deeply into theoretical issues shared by constructivists. Consider, for example, the way that math teachers make strategic use of universalism in teaching number representation. Western students learn base 10 notation as a local skill (our first lessons in writing numbers and counting), but eventually it becomes an invisible universal (after years of practice it becomes unnoticed, a transparent window on the world of numbers). A few years later, students must be reminded of its presence to teach base notation, and often cultural variation is then used (growing up in California, I was introduced to the Mayan base 20 in fifth grade). Finally, students learn that any number could be used as a base; there is a universal principle behind it all. Could such dynamic alternation between the universal and the local be applied in social constructivist analyses? Conversely, taking a lesson from constructivists, perhaps mathematics teachers could find options for ending their alternations in something other than the obligatory finality of universalism.

In teaching anthropology of mathematics at the University of California, I once worked with a Latino student who was particularly resistant any time I brought up an anti-universalist position. In our conversations it finally became apparent that there was a religious principle at stake. He was a devout Catholic, and saw similarity between the reconciliation of his Native American heritage with the Universal Church, and the Platonic view that the apparent cultural diversity in mathematics is actually due to derivations from a single universal source. In other words his local, culturally specific viewpoint was intimately tied to constructions of universality.^[7] Both reflexive critiques of STS -- the caution against localists demanding absolute, universal application of localism -- and new alternatives in the debate (e.g. Haraway's "situated" objectivity) call for investigation of these strategic, dynamic, and multidimensional approaches to positions along (and beyond) the localism-universalism spectrum.

7) Conclusion

As multiculturalism is increasingly felt in the humanities, its comparative absence in science curricula is likely to send the wrong message to students, implying that math, science, and technology is restricted to the European cultural heritage. If there is to be a successful multicultural curriculum in the sciences, it will depend on disciplinary diversity. The anthropology of mathematics can contribute a multifaceted array of approaches, methodologies, and theoretical perspectives.

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